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Personal Property Exemptions and the Uniform
Exemptions Act
At common law, debtor exemptions were rarely reco'gnized
and, generally speaking, every species of a debtor's property was
subject to execution for the payment of a debt.' American legislatures, however, have had more compassion for the judgment
debtor than did the common law. In an effort to protect a portion
of the debtor's holdings, every state has passed personal property
exemption statutes. These statutes are by no means uniform;
even a brief overview reveals broad differences in construction,
emphasis, and items e ~ e m p t e d . ~
In response to this diversity and in an attempt to correct the
inherent flaws in existing state exemption laws, "most of which
are archaic, some of which are unduly generous, and some of
which are extremely n i g g a r d l ~ , "the
~ National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed the Uniform
Exemptions Act. The Uniform Exemptions Act proposes, as an
alternative to the morass of divergent state laws, a single schedule
of exemptions to be applied to all debtors. Several of its sections
apply specifically to personal property exemptions.
After presenting some background observations about the
scope and purpose of personalty exemptions, this Comment will
examine the flaws of existing exemption statutes. An analysis of
the Uniform Exemptions Act as an attempt to rectify those flaws
will follow. Finally, this Comment will suggest modifications
states might consider in adopting the Uniform Exemptions Act.

A. Scope of Personal Property Exemption Law
An exemption from execution has been defined as a debtor's
legal right to retain a portion of his personal property, free from
1. Chandler v. Horne, 23 Ohio App. 1, 4, 154 N.E. 748, 749 (1926).
2. Yale Law Journal sent questionnaires to 104 district court clerks requesting data
concerning the status of those claiming exemptions, the type of claims, and the average
value of the state exemption claimed by bankruptcy candidates. The results indicate a
surprising degree, of diversity in state exemption law. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions:
Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALEL.J. 1459, 1504-07, 1515-16 (1959). See also 52 K Y . L.J.
456 (1964).
ON BANKRUPTCY
LAWSOF THE UNITEDSTATES,
REPORT,
H.R. Doc. No.
3. COMM~SSION
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1973).
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"seizure and sale under legal process for the payment of [his]
debt^."^ In other words, when a debt is created, the creditor does
not look and has no right to look to exempt property as a means
of payment .5
It is essential to acknowledge initially that personal property
exemption law does not exist in a vacuum. It is integrally related
to, yet apart from, bankruptcy proceedings, debtor-creditor relationships, and coexistent exemption statutes. A brief overview of
these related areas will help to clarify the scope of personal property exemption law.
1. Bankruptcy and state personalty exemption law

Although both bankruptcy and state exemption law offer
relief to the improvident and impecunious, there are several factors which indicate that the two procedures are in fact different
and should be treated as such. The first and most obvious consideration is that bankruptcy is a federal proceeding, whereas exemption law lies within the state's special domain.Wut, despite
a proposed Bankruptcy Act that would establish a policy affording all debtors the same exemption rights,' the existing Bankruptcy Act provides that it "shall not affect the allowance to
bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed . . . by the
State laws in force a t the time of the filing of the [bankruptcy]
petition in the State" of d o m i ~ i l eThus,
. ~ even though bankruptcy
proceedings are handled by federal courts and are subject to uniform congressional enactment, a t present, substantive state exemption law is applied in most bankruptcy cases.
A second consideration demonstrating the diversity between
bankruptcy and exemption law is the fact that the procedures
involved in exemption and bankruptcy actions are different. One
procedural difference is that state exemption statutes protect
4. Clark v. Nirembaum, 8 F.2d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1925) cert. denied, Powell v. Anderson, 270 U.S. 649 (1926).
5. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875).
6. The historical interplay between the two illustrates an interesting lesson in federalism and points out the conflicting interests that still exist. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." U.S. CONST.art. 1, 8 8, cl. 4. In accordance with this power, Congress
passed bankruptcy acts in 1800 and 1841 that contained exemption provisions. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, still in force today, however, incorporates the exemption laws of the
appropriate state. The Supreme Court upheld this reference to nonuniform state exemption law against a challenge that it breached the "uniform Laws" requirements of article
one. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
7. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
8. 11 U.S.C. 8 24 (1970).
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debtors only temporarily from the collection efforts of their creditors by postponing payment of the debt, while bankruptcy permanently terminates the creditor's claim and, following discharge, grants the debtor a fresh start? Another dissimilarity is
t h a t bankruptcy requires a total liquidation of the debtor's
nonexempt assets whereas state exemption law does not. These
differences may combine to justify a greater exemption allowance
under exemption statutes than bankruptcy proceedings since a
debtor whose obligation to repay has been postponed through
reliance on an exemption is more likely to rehabilitate his debt
than one whose debt has been cancelled through discharge in
bankruptcy. Thus, given a greater exemption allowance under
state law, a debtor may forego bankruptcy and use his exempt
property to produce income to rehabilitate the debt.1°
2.

Deb tor-creditor relationship

The two categories of creditors most affected by exemption
statutes are unsecured contract creditors and tort victims who
have obtained judgments. Obviously, the debtors who will typically rely on exemption statutes are those who face possible execution against their property because of an inability to pay their
debt. However, there may be any number of reasons for the
9. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
Williams was one of the first cases to state that "the one purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
was to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes." Id.
10. The assumption that exemption of occupationally related personalty would enable the debtor to provide for his immediate needs and ultimately to rehabilitate his debt
is supported by Cleveland Arcade Co. v. Talcott, 22 Ohio App. 516, 154 N.E. 62 (1926),
where the court recognized that execution against a lawyer-debtor's library and office
furniture would "deprive the creditor of the very sources of production which would result
in the payment of indebtedness." Id. a t 517, 154 N.E. a t 63. James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
128 (1972), also lends support to the above assumption by analogy. In the area of wage
garnishment the Court noted that the indigent debtor will find "limited incentive to seek
legitimate employment when . . . [he] knows that his wages will be garnished without
the benefit of the customary exemptions." Id. a t 139.
A statement by the National Conference, however, may lead to a different conclusion,
i.e., that liberal exemption laws may prompt debtors to resort to bankruptcy:
The existence of discrepancies between the exemptions available under the
Bankruptcy Act and those provided by state law would furnish an incentive for
the invocation of relief under the Act; if the federal exemptions are more generous, a debtor will be encouraged to file a petition under the Act to obtain the
enlarged benefits i t affords against his creditors; if the federal exemptions are
less liberal, creditors may be persuaded to precipitate involuntary bankruptcy
in order to reach property not leviable under state law.
UNIFORM
EXEMPTIONS
ACT, Prefatory Note at 7.
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debtor's inability to pay-improvidence, sudden medical emergencies, or loss of a job, to name a few.
Whether it is desirable to undercut the financial expectations
of creditors to safeguard a debtor from total liquidation, therefore
subjecting the creditor to a loss, is a frequently raised question.
The answer would appear to depend on the basis of the creditor's
interest. For example, while contract creditors have an opportunity to select their debtors and extend credit in light of exemption
law, l tort victims have no such opportunity. l2 Moreover, assumption of risk is an element of the creditor's business that is reflected
in his interest rates;13it is not a factor in tort judgments. Therefore, while it would be unfair to penalize a tort victim through
operation of exemption statutes, it is not as unfair to require the
contract creditor to share the burden of his debtor's financial
distress.
3. Personal property and coexistent exemption law

Personal property exemptions are only one part of a complex
exemption picture. Other exemption statutes, which include exemptions for homesteads,14wages,15and the proceeds from welfare
funds and insurance policies,16 are also part of the panorama of
exemption law. As a result, reference to these other exemption
laws is necessary to understand exemptions in their totality. The
views and proposals of this Comment, then, should not be read
in isolation, but rather in connection with other relevant exemption procedures. With the scope of exemption law in mind, it is
possible to analyze the concepts and policies upon which personal
property exemption law is founded.
11. See Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWAL. REV.445,450
( 1960).

12. In early cases some courts refused to allow exemptions against tort claims, reasoning that such claims are not contemplated within the meaning of "debt." See, e.g., Erlenbach v. Cox, 206 Ala. 298, 89 So. 465 (1921); Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490
EXEMPTIONS
ACT §
(1936). See also 25 MINN.L. REV. 66, 77-78 (1940). But see UNIFORM
l ( 1 ) (defining "debt" as "a legally enforceable monetary obligation or liability of a n
individual, whether arising out of contract, tort, or otherwise").
13. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
14. See generally Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV.L. REV.1289 (1950).
15. See generally Abrahams & Feldman, The Exemption of Wages from Garnishment: Some Comparisons and Comments, 3 DE PAULL. REV.153 (1954).
16. See generally Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 807-13,
820-21 (1974).
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B. The Purpose of Exemption Law
The purpose of exemption statutes has often been declared
by the Supreme Court, state legislatures, and state courts. In the
leading case of Bronson v. Kinzie,17 Chief Justice Taney .stated
that exemption law is intended "to secure [debtors] from unjust
and harassing litigation, and to protect them in those pursuits
which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every community."18 That the purpose of exemption law is founded on ininterests of humanity and generosity is reinforced as being "for
the protection and benefit of a poor debtor and his helpless family, to give them the bread of life, and a pillow whereon to lay the
head, to save them from destitution and absolute want."lg Thus,
there are three intended beneficiaries of exemption law: the
debtor,20the debtor's family,21and the debtor's c o m m ~ n i t y . ~ ~
The purpose of exemption law can be more fully understood
after a consideration of the emotional and economic considerations underlying exemption statutes. Also, in addition to humanitarian concern for the debtor, the economic rights of creditors
must also be considered and the conflicting interests of the debtor
and creditor carefully weighed. A consideration of these factors
follows.
I.

Emotional and economic considerations

Traditionally the debtor has been subject to harsh treatment
and severe disciplinary penalties. Imprisonment for debt and
other oppressive measures were known in Roman law,23and were
17. 42 U.S. (1How.) 311 (1843).
18. Id. at 315-16. A similar statement amplifying the purpose of exemptions is found
in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1940): "[Tjhe usual purpose of
exemptions is to relieve the person exempted from the pressure of claims hostile to his
dependents' essential needs as well as his personal ones . . . ."
19. State v. Allen, 48 W. Va. 154, 162-63, 35 S.E. 990, 993 (1900).
20. See Michigan Pub. School Employees' Retirement Bd. v. Peterson, 39 Mich. App.
568, 197 N.W.2d 854 (1972); State v. Monaco, 81 N.J. Super. 448, 195 A.2d 910 (1963).
21. See Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1940);Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 175, 131 P. 697, 699 (1913). See also NEB.REV.STAT.§ 25-1552 (1975);
N.M. STAT.ANN. 4 24-5-1 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE§ 34-4 (Supp. 1977)(each providing
special exemption treatment for heads of families).
22. See Slyfield v. Willard, 43 Wash. 179, 182, 86 P. 392, 394 (1906).
23. Roman law provided that if a debt remained unpaid for a certain period of time
"the debtor might be killed or sold into slavery, and competing creditors might divide the
body into pieces proportionate to the amount of each one's claim." Ford, Imprisonment
for Debt, .25 MICH.L. REV.24, 24-25 (1926).
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utilized by the early English common law courts.24Even though
colonial insolvency acts recognized humanitarian objective^,^^
America was not free from similar harsh measures.
[lTjhe high incidence of default in the generation after the Revolution made the debtors' prison a visibly obnoxious feature of
American life. The poor were the chief victims. About sixty per
cent of the prisoners owed no more than ten dollars. . . . In
some cases confinement dragged on for years, and inevitably
there were instances of the grossest inhumanity-nursing mothers deprived of their liberty, aged Revolutionary veterans jailed
for trifling amounts, prisoners crowded into tiny, foul cells, and
cases of exploitation, brutality, and death.26

It was against this historical backdrop that alternative measures for treating insolvents evolved.27"[Tlhe person, then the
personal property, and finally the real estate were freed from
control of the creditor through the abolition of imprisonment for
debt, the extension of chattel exemptions and the adoption of the
homestead exemption, with limitation^."^^ The repugnancy of
imprisonment for debt unmistakably stands as an initial step
toward the enactment of exemption statutes. This repugnancy
advances a strong emotional argument in favor of exemption statutes, but there has long existed an economic as well as an emotional concern supporting the enactment of such statutes.
As early as A.D. 321, Emperor Constantine prohibited his tax
24. The common law was a t one time very harsh toward the recalcitrant debtor. One
early common law judge issued the following invective:
If a man be taken in execution and lie in prison for debt, neither the plaintiff
a t whose suit he is arrested, nor the sheriff who took him, is bound to find him
meat, drink, or clothes; but he must live on his own, or on the charity of others:
and if no man will relieve him, let him die in the name of God, says the law;
and so say I.
Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 786 (Ex. 1659) (footnote omitted). See generally Note,
Present Status of Execution Against the Body of the Judgment Debtor, 42 IOWAL. REV.
306, 306-07 (1957).
DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS
IN AMERICA
13 (1974).
25. P.COLEMAN,
26. Id. at 254. An equally strong statement denouncing the harsh practice of imprisonment for debt was issued by the Supreme Court.
Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. . . . It breaks the
spirit of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and
dooms him, while i t lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud, it is the
opposite of remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when such a blot is ,
removed from the statute-book.
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 602 (1877) (citation omitted).
27. TEX.CONST.art. 16, § 50 (interpretative commentary describes the evolution of
exemption law in Texas jurisprudence).
28. 1018-3rd Street v. Texas, 331 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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collectors from seizing "slaves, oxen, or implements used for the
cultivation of the soil . . . by which act the payment of taxes may
be delayed."29Thus, the desire to maintain a constant source of
tax revenue was recognized in ancient Rome as a justification for
exempting occupationally related property of debtors from seizure. Similar economic justifications emerged in common law
England," but, it was not until 1845 that benevolence prevailed
over creditors' interests. In that year, the Small Debt Act was
enacted "to protect the actual necessaries" of the debtor from
execution.31
The modern American counterparts of England's first exemption statutes recognize the practical economic aspects of exemption provisions and also square economic practicality with
humanity. Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Jones32illustrates
the delicate balancing required if economic reality and humanitarian interests are to be merged. In the Hollywood decision the
court stated:
[Exemption] laws are passed not only for protection of low
income families, but also for the protection of the community
at large. They are designed to give assurance that the wage
earner shall always have enough, beyond the reach of attaching
creditors, to support his family and to prevent them from becoming public charges.33
2.

Balancing debtor and creditor interests

Although modern courts have been quick to extend protection to the debtor, it must be conceded that creditors do have just
and enforceable rights against the debtor. The importance of the
creditor's rights, although often overlooked, has been well expressed.
Notwithstanding the benevolent provisions of the statute . . .
[clreditors are still recognised as having some rights . . . . It
29. 14 JUSTINIAN,
THECIVIL
LAW263 (S. Scott trans. 1932).
30. See, e.g., Sunbolf v. Alford, 150 Eng. Rep. 1135 (Ex. 1838) (holding that a man's
clothing could not be seized from his person to satisfy a debt); Hutchins v. Chambers, 97
Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1758) (holding that an exemption existed for the tools, utensils, and
animals by which the debtor earned his livelihood. The common law court apparently
reasoned that to seize these possessions would be to deprive the debtor of the means
necessary to rehabilitate the debt).
31. Small Debts Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 127, § 8. The "actual necessaries" were
construed to include only bedding, wearing apparel, and tools of trade not to exceed the
pittance of five pounds sterling.
32. 117 A.2d 226 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955).
33. Id. a t 227.
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frequently happens that the creditor is more in need of public
sympathy than the debtor. When a poor man is unjustly kept
out of money due to him, the distress arising from the want of
it is often greater than that caused to the other party by its
collection. If the suffering was but equal, it is plain that one man
should not suffer for the follies or misfortunes of another. Every
one should bear his own b ~ r t h e n . ~ ~

It therefore becomes apparent that the scales weighing justice for the creditor on the one hand and mercy for the debtor on
the other require careful balancing. Simply stated, to severely
burden a debtor is to invite the emotional and economic arguments voiced above, yet to deny a creditor his just due is equally
onerous.35
Historical, economic, and emotional considerations constitute a portion of the crucible in which the need, justification, and
purpose for exemption law were formed. These factors are still
potent and state legislatures and national committees must continue to take them into account when weighing the conflicting
interests of the debtor and creditor when drafting appropriate
legi~lation.~'

The contention of several commentators and the thrust of the
Uniform Exemptions Act is that the deference given the exemption enactments of the several states has resulted in gross diver34. Case v. Dunmore, 23 Pa. 93,94-95 (1854). This quotation is used not to overstate
the creditor's case, but rather to suggest that the relative welfare of the parties may be
part of the delicate balancing mechanism.
35. The balance between debtor and creditor interests is, however, extremely complex, due in part to the economic, historical, and political "anvil" upon which the state
exemption laws were formed and fashioned, see Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique
and Suggestions, 168 YALEL.J. 1459, 1463 (1959), the states' interest in providing for the
welfare of their constituencies, see, e.g., Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So.2d 792, 794 (Fla. 19541,
and the public's demand for free availability of credit, see generally Kennedy, Limitation
of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA
L. REV.445, 450 (1960).
36. That state legislatures are sensitive to conflicting interests and to the injustice
that can result if one interest is weighed more heavily than the other is borne out by an
official committee comment to the Michigan personal property exemption statute. In
explaining why it increased the tools of the trade exemption from $350 to $1000, the
committee stated:
With prices as they are today, it is difficult to see how a person could
continue in business while keeping less than $1,000 of his stock or equipment.
Of course, the amount will vary, but it is felt that $1,000 will tend to save the
"little" man, and still subject those with larger businesses to payment of their
debts.
MICH.
COMP.LAWSANN. Q 600.6023 (1968) (Comment 5).
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sity and major flaws. The most frequently raised criticisms are
the statutes' lack of uniformity, their archaic nature and their
unfortunate drafting."

A. Lack of Uniformity
Even a quick glance at the state codes reveals that exemption
law today is a crazy quilt of statutes reflecting influences based
, ~ ~ property values,39and diveron dominant state i n d u s t r i e ~rising
sification of occupational trends40 within the individual states.
Observers of state exemption law, many of whom are "astounded
by the enormous disparity, contend the disparity is unsatisfactory because: (1)decisions to move or stay within a state may be
influenced by the amount of the exemption offered, (2) application of different standards between the several states may subject
legitimate debts to increased jeopardy, and (3) fragmented exemption policy may impose an undue burden on interstate credit.
Many, therefore, conclude that exemption law should be governed by a single uniform system.42

B. 0bsolescence
Several commentators have accurately demonstrated that
many of the state exemption statutes are badly in need of reformeuRising property values, a higher standard of living, and
inflationary spirals all combine to make even the most recently
revised statutes outmoded.44Although some state legislatures
37. See, e.g., UNIFORM
EXEMPTIONSACT,Prefatory Note at 7; Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 18002, 53 CORNELL
L. REV.663, 665-70 (1968).
38. MASS.GEN.LAWSANN. ch. 235, 8 34 (West 1959) (exempting fishing boats and
equipment); NEV.REV.STAT.8 21.090(e)(l) (1977) (exempting mining equipment).
39. CAI,. CIV.CODE8 1260 (West 1954 & Supp. 1977) (homestead exemption increased
from $12,500 to $30,000 for head of family and from $5,000 to $15,000 for others); ILL. ANN.
STAT.ch. 52, 8 1 (Smith-Hurd 1967 & Supp. 1977) (homestead exemption increased from
$5,000 to $10,000).
40. ARIZ.REV.STAT.8 33-1130(3) (Supp. 1974) (camping outfit of a prospector, including mining tools, saddle, and burro, exempted).
EXEMPTIONS
ACT,Prefatory Note a t 8.
41. UNIFORM
EXEMPTIONS
42. UNIFORM
ACT, Prefatory Note a t 7; Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions:
L. REV. 663, 665-70 (1968).
A Full Circle Back to the Act of 18002, 53 CORNELL
43. See Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 18008, 53
CORNELL
L. REV.663 (1968); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68
YALEL.J. 1459 (1959).
44. See, e.g., ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. 8 33-1124 (West 1974) (two horses or two mules
and their harnesses); Miss. CODEANN. 8 85-3-1 (1972) (two work horses or mules and one
yoke of oxen).
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have responded to the cry for reform,45the majority still lags
behind.
This problem of obsolescence is not new to exemption law.
Nearly three decades ago one federal judge sharply criticized a
state statute, declaring that certain sections literally went "back
to the yoke of oxen days."46The judge urged that "[tlhe entire
section should be forthwith modernized, fairly as to the various
classifications, with a factual appreciation of present-day times,
needs and values."47 Sadly enough, it is this urgent need for a
"factual appreciation of present-day times" that still plagues
modern exemption law.

C . Problems in Statutory Structure
Modern exemption statutes are flawed not only by references
to wagons, carriages, and yokes of oxen-indicia of gross obsolescence-but also by inept statutory structure.48The methodology
of a majority of state enactments falls within one of three general
approaches: specific enumeration, restricted selection from specified categories, or open-ended exemption based on n e c e ~ s i t y . ~ ~
Each of these categories suffers from its own particular ailments.
In the following evaluation of the effectiveness of the statutes
within each category, particular attention will be given to the
manner in which the type of exemption employed is able to meet
the conflicting interests of the debtor and creditor.
1.

Specific enumeration

Many personal property exemption statutes endeavor to list
specific items a judgment debtor can withhold from execution.
Typical examples of specifically enumerated items are the family
Bible, a church pew, a burial lot, and wearing apparel? This type
of statute is desirable in that it provides the debtor and creditor
with a maximum degree of certainty-both know exactly what is
45. See Trost, Recent Developments in Debtor Botection: New Exemption Laws, 46
CAL. ST. B.J. 639 (1971).
46. In re Rash, 81 F . Supp. 389, 394 (W.D. Wash. 1948).
47. Id.
48. These twin flaws of obsolescence and poor statutory structure are common to both
the specific-enumeration and restricted-selection-from-specified-categoriesapproaches.
49. Similar categories have been previously enumerated by several commentators.
See generally 52 KY.L.J. 456, 457 (1964); 74 W. VA.L. REV.370, 370 (1971).
50. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.STAT.ch. 52 4 13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); KAN.STAT.ANN.
4 60-2304(1), (4) (1976); ME. REV.STAT.ANN. tit. 14, 4 4401(2)-(4) (West 1964 & Supp.
1977).
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to be excluded should a judgment be rendered against the debtor.
Specific enumeration, however, fails to grant the debtor the
flexibility necessary to meet his individual needs. For example,
although the specifically itemized exemption may have been necessary a t the time the legislation was passed, its utility may have
become obsolete, or another item, not within the exemption, may
have taken its place as a household ne~essity.~'
It is no comfort
in such circumstances for the debtor to be able to exclude an item
that has no practical value. Despite the efforts of a conscientious
legislature, therefore, enactments which list items of marginal
necessity are soon outdated and, as a result, fail to accurately
reflect a debtor's immediate needs.
2. Restricted selection from specified categories

Several statutes allow the judgment debtor to select which
of his holdings within a specified category will be exempt up to a
certain monetary limit. Common examples are "[t]ools of his
occupation t o t h e value of six hundred dollars"52 a n d
"[h]ousehold furniture not exceeding two hundred dollars in
value. "53
Allowing the debtor to select the items most valuable to his
family a t a given time is a major advantage of this type of statute.
Another desirable feature is that the fixed amount, although perennially and notoriously low, gives the parties a definite indication of the type and value of personalty that can be withheld.
Unfortunately, however, the areas in which selection is allowed are often very narrowly p r e s ~ r i b e d .Such
~ ~ an enactment
not only limits the debtor's flexibility, but also restricts the
debtor's freedom of choice, making the selection process some51. The automobile is a prime example. A number of turn-of-the-century exemption
statutes excluded wagons, teams, and other horsedrawn vehicles from execution. Following the advent of the automobile some controversy was generated as to whether it should
fit within the exempt category. Jurisdictions split on whether emphasis should be placed
on the necessity of the auto in modem life or whether the statutes drafted before the
invention of the auto should be given a strict construction. For cases exempting automobiles as carriages, buggies, or like vehicles, see Patten v. Sturgeon, 214 F. 65 (8th Cir.
1914); Hickman v. Hickman, 149 Tex. 439,234 S.W.2d 410 (1950). For cases taking a more
literal view, see In re McEuen, 19 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Ky. 1937); Posnanovic v. Maki,
209 Minn. 379, 296 N.W. 415 (1941).
52. N.H. REV.STAT.ANN. 4 511:2 (Supp. 1977).
53. Mo. ANN.STAT.4 513.435(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
54. E.g., MINN.STAT.ANN. 4 550.37 (West Supp. 1978)(exempting "all wearing apparel, one watch, household furniture, utensils, household appliances, phonographs, radio
and television receivers, and foodstuffs of the debtor and family, not exceeding $3,000 in
value").
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what less than meaningful.
More favorable legislation would abolish narrow selection
areas55and allow the debtor to choose to withdraw from execution
any of his personalty within a reasonable monetary limit. Moreover, since a fixed monetary amount is also subject to becoming
obsolete in inflationary periods, this type of legislation could be
made more effective by requiring periodic readjustment or by
tying the monetary limitation to an accurate price indi~ator.~"
3. Open-ended exemption based on necessity

A few jurisdictions have passed laws allowing exemption of
"[all1 implements of husbandry used upon the h~mestead,"~'
or
"[tlhe tools of a mechanic necessary for carrying on his trade."58
This formulation is very fluid and assures the debtor of needed
accommodations despite changing circumstances and needs.
The creditor, however, is placed in the difficult position of
having his claim compromised by a court decree determining
which of the debtor's holdings are "reasonably necessary" and
therefore excluded. Additionally, the determination of what is
necessary to the debtor is likely to be a source of much litigation
and the time and cost involved in a case-by-case adjudication of
"necessity" is burdensome and disadvantageous to both debtor
and creditor.59
Lack of uniformity, obsolescence, and poor statutory structure are severe weaknesses of the current personal property exemption scheme. Uniform exemptions legislation is a vehicle by
which needed changes can be made and innovative exemption
policy established.

The Uniform Exemptions Act (UEA) is a concerted attempt
to rectify the faults that undeniably exist in many state exemption schemes. It proposes a single system of exemptions applicable to all debtors. In considering the UEA's application to per55. See, e.g., IND.CODEANN. § 34-2-28-1 (Bums Supp. 1977) (area of selection includes real estate, "tangible personal property," and "intangible personal property").
CONSUMER
56. Adjustment of dollar amounts as provided for in § 1.106of the UNIFORM
CREDIT
CODEis also recommended by the UNIFORM
EXEMPTIONS
Am § 2.
57. OKLA.STAT.ANN.tit. 31, 8 l(4) (West Supp. 1977).
58. MISS.
CODEANN.§ 85-3-1 (1972).
59. Litigation over what is necessary may be, however, a necessary evil especially if
the delicate balance between debtor's and creditor's interests involved in the administration of exemption law is to be adequately considered.
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sonal property law it will be helpful to review the history, the
relevant sections, and the advantages and disadvantages of the
uniform legislation.

A. History
Perhaps the most persuasive factor leading the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National
Conference) to propose the UEA was thg introduction of a bill in
Congress that would prescribe a single schedule of federal bankruptcy exemptions? In response to this congressional action, the
National Conference decided in 1974 to prepare draft uniform
exemptions legislation. Several drafts were submitted by a special drafting committee during 1974 and 1975, and the final draft
was "considered, amended, promulgated and recommended to
the several states for enactmentws1when the National Conference
convened at its 1976 annual meeting. Since its promulgation,
however, no state has enacted the UEA.62

B. Relevant Sections
Although the Uniform Exemptions Act covers many areas of
exemption law, only section 2 (adjustments of dollar amounts),
section 5 (property exempt without limitation), section 6 (property exempt to extent reasonably necessary for support), and section 8 (exemptions of personal property subject to value limits)
are directly applicable to personal property exemption law.63A
brief summary of these sections will clarify their potential impact
on the current status of exemption law.
1. Adjustment of dollar amounts

Section 2 of the UEA, patterned after section 1.106 of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, requires that all dollar amounts
be adjusted by reference to either: (1) the Consumer Price Index
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers: U.S. City Average, compiled by the United States Department of Labor Statistics, (2) a regional consumer price index, or (3) any state statute
60. UNIFORM
EXEMP~ONS
Am, Prefatory Note a t 7.
61. Id. at 9.
62. UNIFORM
LAWSANN., DIRECTORY
OF UNIFORM
ACTS& TABLES
OF ADOPTING
(master ed. 1978).
JURISDI~ONS
63. These sections are relevant to personal property exemption law even though 8 6 5
and 7 include as "property" items not generally thought to constitute tangible personalty
such as veteran's benefits, awards under a crime victim's reparation act, death benefits,
and unemployment compensation.
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of general application providing for periodic adjustment of dollar
amounts by reference to a price or other economic index." This
section is one of the most innovative and useful provisions of the
Act and introduces a simple but effective answer to the very real
problem of coping with the "ravages of economic . . . changesMfi5
that have plagued state exemption statutes for too many years.
2. Property exemption without limitation
The provisions of section 5 grant absolute exemption status
to two classifications of tangible personal property. Subsection
(1)exempts "a burial plot for the individual and his family" and
subsection (2) excludes from execution "health aides reasonably
necessary to enable the individual or a dependent to work or to
sustain health." These provisions are somewhat similar to specific enumeration statutes but avoid the obsolescence problem
because they represent a narrow group of items that are of unchanging necessity.
3. Property exempt to extent reasonably necessary for support

Although section 6(a) enumerates certain monetary benefits
and awards not commonly thought of as personalty, the relevant
core of this section exempts from execution the property
"required to meet the present and anticipated needs of the individual and his dependent^."^^ The determination of what constitutes property necessary for support is made by the court "after
consideration of the individual's responsibilities and all the present and anticipated property and income of the indi~idual."~'
This section incorporates, therefore, many of the desirable features of open-ended statutes while wisely giving the court some
factors to analyze in weighing what is "necessary."
4.

Exemptions of personal property subject to value limitations

The items enumerated under section 8 closely resemble and
are fairly typical of existing state statutes allowing restricted
selection from specified categories of personalty. Subsection (a)
allows an exemption of up to $500 for each item of property constituting: (1) household furnishings and appliances found to be
reasonably necessary; (2) wearing apparel, animals, books, and
64. UNIFORM
EXEMPTIONS
ACT fj 2(a), Comments (2) and (3).
65. Id., Prefatory Note at 10.
66. Id. fj 6(b).
67. Id.
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musical instruments reasonably held for personal use of the individual and his family; and (3) family portraits and heirlooms of
particular sentimental value to the individual. Subsection (b)
exempts up to $750 of jewelry if "held for the personal use of an
individual or a dependent." Subsection (c) excludes from execution an aggregate value of $1,000 in "implements, professional
books, and tools of the trade" and in addition "an exemption of
one motor vehicle . . . of a value not exceeding $1,500." Finally,
subsection (d) provides, in addition to any other exemption, an
exemption of cash and other "liquid assets" (deposits, securities,
notes, drafts, accrued vacation pay, refunds, and other receivables) of $500 if the individual claims a homestead or $1,500 if
he does not? Section 8, like many state statutes, restricts the
property exempted to set dollar amounts, but unlike most state
statutes, permits the debtor to select that property from a rather
broad classification range. More importantly, the section sidesteps the problem of crystallization of the dollar limits because
section 2 requires periodic adjustment of all dollar amounts.

C. Evaluation of the Uniform Exemptions Act
1. Advantages

The Uniform Exemptions Act incorporates many important
features that should be carefully considered by states contemplating its adoption. The greatest advantages of the UEA are
those inherent in a uniform exemption system. Uniformity will
guarantee certainty of procedure. Both the debtor and the creditor will benefit from knowing the type and value of exempt items
and will be able to conduct their credit relationships accordingly.
Importantly, a well-drafted uniform system will eliminate the
diversity and flaws that have stemmed from the perpetuation of
outmoded and poorly structured state statutes.
Another attractive feature of the UEA is its general conformity to the policy of the proposed Bankruptcy Act?' This conformity is made all the more appealing by the fact that a bankruptcy
proposal prescribing a uniform exemption has recently passed the
House of representative^.'^
One of the most needed and desirable innovations made by
the Act is the adjustment of dollar amounts through a tie-in to a
68. Id. 9 8(a)-(d).
69. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
70. H.R.8200 was passed by a voice vote on Feb. 1, 1978 and referred to the Senate
REC.H478 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978).
Committee on the Judiciary. 124 CONG.
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reliable price indicator. This provision introduces an easily administered and effective means of dealing with the old problem
of dollar-limit obsolescence.
Several advantages also accrue through the operation of the
recommended uniform schedule of exemptions. One of these advantages is that any exemption subject to the debtor's selection
must meet a standard of reasonable necessity. The operation of
this requirement could well act to negate compulsive and unwise
selection by the debtor of items that may prove to be unnecessary
and thus hinder the rehabilitation of the debtor's obligations. In
addition, the UEA gives some direction in determining
"necessity" to the court by requiring "consideration of the individual's responsibilities and all the present and anticipated property and income of the individual, including that which is exempt. "71
The official comment following section 8 of the UEA indicates that another advantage in the operation of the Act is that
the value limitation of $500 per item contained in that section will
significantly reduce the administrative time and cost involved in
obtaining an appraisal of all the personal property claimed by the
debtor. This advantage will result because "most individuals do
not have any property within the listed categories having a value
close enough to the statutory maximum [of $5001 to warrant
appraisal. "72
As is apparent, the draftsmen of the UEA have merged the
most popular aspects of current exemption structure, including
the absolute exemption of necessary items, restricted selection
from specified categories, and open-ended exemption based on
necessity. Significantly, this feat was accomplished without piggybacking a number of the undesirable features of the named
structural modes.
2. Disadvantages

Notwithstanding its many positive aspects, the Uniform
Exemptions Act is not free from blemish and in examining its
provisions certain disadvantages should be considered. The primary contention against the uniform act is an argument against
the very concept of a uniform system. Even though nonuniformity
may cause confusion and lead to the application of different standards among the several states, it is arguable that exemption
71. UNIFORM
EXEMPTIONS
ACI' 8 6(b).
72. Id. 8 8, Comment (2).
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statutes are not the type of legislation that can best be regulated
through a uniform national system.73On the contrary, local conconcerns might so outweigh the desire for uniformity that the diversity of exemption law a t the state level is not merely justifiable, but actually necessary. Even the National Conference recognized the strength of this argument.
Some variation in the exemptions provided by state law
may be sought to be justified as related to different standards,
costs, and modes of life that prevail in the different states. To
the extent that the justification has validity, it affords warrant
for variations in allowable exemptions within state boundaries

. . . .74

A second area of concern centers around the rejection by the
National Conference of the view that every debtor should be entitled to a "minimum g r u b ~ t a k e . "A
~ ~few commentators have advocated that the best exemption policy would grant such a single
cash a l l o ~ a n c eIt
. ~can
~ also be argued that failure to grant this
minimum allowance in addition to exemption rights may work a
hardship on the poor or uninformed who may not, through the
exercise of personalty exemptions, be able to salvage all of their
actual necessities without a minimum grubstake.
A practical problem in the application of the UEA is the
adjudication of what is meant by "necessary for support." Even
though courts are given a definition of necessity and other definitional guidelines, this provision will mandate the cost and delay
inherent in case-by-case determinations.
Another practical problem is that the UEA, like current exemption statutes, fails to take into account many intangibles that
are superimposed on debtor-creditor relationships. Consideration
of these intangibles is the most vexing problem in the drafting of
effective exemption legislation, because the written word of a
statute cannot always balance the competing interests of the
debtor and creditor in the individual case. A few of the host of
intangible factors that should be considered are: (1)whether the
debt judgment was founded in tort or ~ o n t r a c t , ~(2)
' whether the
73. As early as 1851 the Supreme Court recognized that some fields of commerce were
so fraught with local concerns that uniform national regulation was impractical. See
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
EXEMPTIONS
Am, Prefatory Note at 8.
74. UNIFORM
75. Id. at 9.
76. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?,53
L. REV.663, 671 (1968); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and
CORNELL
Suggestions, YALEL.J. 1459, 1507 (1959).
77. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
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debtor can obtain support from his family, (3) whether the nonpayment of the debt was caused by improvidence or as a result
of medical or other unforeseen expenses, (4) whether the debtor
is also in possession of real property, and (5) whether the relative
welfare of the debtor vis-a-vis the creditor demands special treatment.78
The constitutionality of uniform exemption legislation, the
effect of which would modify existing practices and policies, is
another potential weakness. Such midstream alterations may result in constitutional challenges based on the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the provision against impairment of contracts found in article one, section ten of the Constitution. Debtors and creditors have both, on occasion, claimed a
vested interest in exemption statutes and argued that increasing
or decreasing the allotted exemption constitutes a violation of due
process.79It is conceivable that enactment of the UEA would
trigger similar claims based on the due process clause.
Article one, section ten of the Constitution provides that no
state shall pass any "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
Originally, the Supreme Court closely scrutinized the effects of
alterations in exemption law,80invalidating all such changes
where "the law which prevailed when the contract was made has
been so far changed that there does not remain a substantial and
reasonable mode of enforcing it in the ordinary and regular course
of
With the passage of time, however, the strict scrutiny required by early Supreme Court interpretations of the contract
clause has gradually been eroded by exceptions," and in later
opinions the contract clause has been construed so as not to override valid exercises of the states' police power.83But notwith78. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
79. Cases in which debtor claims vested right: Petrulionis v. Dudek, 113 Ill. App. 2d
398, 401-02, 252 N.E.2d 23,25 (1969); Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N.Y.358,373,94 N.E.
1001, 1006 (1911); Majors v. Carter, 175 Tenn. 450, 453, 135 S.W.2d 924, 925 (1940). Case
in which creditor claims such a right: Hooter v. Wilson, 256 So. 2d 808 (La. Ct. App. 1972),
rev 'd, 273 So. 2d 516 (La. 1973).
80. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877).
81. Id. at 611-12 (Hunt, J., concurring).
82. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548
(1914); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
83. The contract clause, if interpreted as precluding any state legislative action impinging on contractual rights, has the capacity to stifle a state's exercise of police power.
Likewise, the police powers, if interpreted to its broadest limits, has an equal capacity to
render the contract clause ineffectual. In both Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro,
232 U.S. 48 (1914) and Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), the
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standing its declining impact, the contract clause may have been
imbued with new life by United States Trust Co. v. New Y ~ r k , ~ ~
a recent Supreme Court decision. United States Trust Co. reversed the trend of recent years and for the first time in nearly
four decades invalidated a state law as violative of the contract
clause. Although the case involved impairment of state rather
than private contract^,^^ the decision may have future application
to exemption law.
But, although blemished, the UEA does not appear to be
fatally flawed. For example, even though due process arguments
may be leveled a t the Act, these contentions become somewhat
dubious when one realizes that courts have been very hesitant to
find that a vested right exists in exemption statutes. Moreover,
although the United States Trust Co. case has apparently revitalized the contract clause, the rationale of the case may not apply
to the alteration of private as compared to state contract^.^"
As for other weaknesses of the Act, the fact that the
"necessity" of certain exemptions must be adjudicated does not,
of itself, render the UEA undesirable. Not only does the Act give
definitional guidelines, but through the implementation of innovative judicial techniques the burden of case-by-case adjudication can be lessened? Furthermore, the advantages of a uniform
system-continuity of procedure, free flow of interstate credit,
and certainty of application-all strongly favor the UEA. Therefore, despite its flaws, the UEA still stands as a well-worded and
carefully researched proposal which, with appropriate modificaCourt has issued broad statements that tend to subjugate the contract clause to the valid
exercise of the police power. In Goldsboro the Court declared,
[I]t is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process" clause
has the effect of overriding the power of the state to establish all regulat'ionsthat
are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or
general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor
bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract
and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.
232 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added). See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. at 429-30.
84. 431 US. 1 (1977).
85. The suit involved the 1974 repeal of a 1962 statutory covenant between New York
and New Jersey that limited the ability of the New York Port Authority to subsidize rail
passenger transportation from certain bond revenues and reserves. Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion indicated that a state that has enacted a law impairing its own rather than
a private obligation must meet a strict scrutiny standard-the enactment must be shown
to be both "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose" in order to
pass muster under the contract clause. Id. a t 25.
.
86.Id.
87. See notes 89-91and accompanying text infnr.
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tions and following careful study, should be implemented by all
states.

D. Possible Modification of the UEA
The following represent a few of the modifications a ratifying
state may incorporate into the UEA to make it a more effective
piece of legislation. These modifications would help the ratifying
state cope with two areas that loom as potential trouble spots in
the Act-providing a "minimum grubstake," and balancing the
competing interests of debtor and creditor.
1.

Guaranteed minimum exemption

In addition to exemptions granted by the UEA, a state
adopting the Act could also guarantee a minimum exemption.88
This modification could be accomplished by expanding the number of items awarded absolute exemption. Such items as family
books and pictures, all wearing apparel, a television or radio receiver, ordinary kitchen utensils and place settings, and one
year's supply of provisions and fuel could be added. Another approach would be to determine a set monetary allowance, such as
$1,000, which would be absolutely exempt from execution. The
figure would have to be made subject to mandatory adjustment
either by frequent legislative review or by a tie-in to a reliable
price index.
2. Innovative judicial administration

In order to effectively balance the interests involved in
debtor-creditor relationships and to adequately determine what
constitutes "reasonable necessity" under the Act, the adopting
state could incorporate one of a number of developing judicial
administrative techniques. The practices best suited to meet the
needs of exemption law are supplementary proceedings and the
neighborhood court system.
a. Supplementary proceedings. Once a claim has been filed
and an exemption exercised, a state could provide for a supplementary proceeding a t the election of either the debtor or creditor
in which the legal ritual and evidentiary requirements would be
relaxed. The arbiter would be given broad discretion in such proceedings to weigh the underlying factors in making a fair decision.
88. A set minimum exemption would have the advantage of guaranteeing the debtor's
subsistence without the need for a judicial determination.
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Despite procedural difficulties, meager court facilities, and enforcement problems, in 1935 New York had limited success with
its supplementary proceeding^.^^ It is feasible that such an action
could have application to uniform exemption law.
b. Neighborhood court system. An even more novel approach to judicial administration of exemption law has been suggested by Edgar and Jean Cahn, who advocate a neighborhood
court system.90Cahn and Cahn state:
There is a clear need for the creation, on a neighborhood
level, of mechanisms for settling disputes, dispensing remedies
and enunciating norms of conduct. Those needs cannot be dealt
with by any single means. Some conflicts can best be resolved
by adjudication; others can be amicably settled by mutual consent; still others are pseudo-conflictsbased on false assumptions
or lack of knowledge about alternatives, resources and sources
of assistance.
We believe that a neighborhood court system so constructed
as to utilize a variety of approaches to conflict resolution would
make a substantial contribution to the rule of law, and would
constitute a tangible and significant response to the demand for
a share, a voice, and a role in the new dispensation of justi~e.~'

In their observations, the Cahns recognize inherent problems in
the administration and enforcement of a quasi-judicial neighborhood court system, but i t is conceivable that these problems
could be alleviated and a neighborhood proceeding used to make
exemption law a better vehicle for balancing the conflicting needs
of the debtor and creditor.
Both the neighborhood court system and supplementary proceedings could be incorporated into the UEA system as elective
provisions and could be used either as an alternative to a formal
levy and execution action or as an additional factfinding hearing.
The eligibility requirements for these provisions should be left to
the adopting state, but may include minimum and maximum
debt and exemption limits, a showing that the party is entering
with clean hands, or a minimum bond requirement to insure that
the proceedings are held in good faith. A less formal atmosphere
would prevail at these proceedings and the parties would be en89. See generally Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments: Experimentation with
Supplementary Proceedings, 36 COLUM.
L. REV.1061 (1936);Cohen, Collection cf Money
L. REV.1007 (1935).
Judgments in New York: Supplementary Proceedings, 35 COLUM.
90. See generally Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective
Revisited, 41 NOTRE
DAMELAW. 927, 950-60 (1966).
91. Id. at 950.
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couraged, through the mediation of an arbiter, to resolve their
conflicts and arrive a t an equitable plan of restitution or partial
repayment. Ideally, the resolution will take into account the
unique factual underpinnings of the conflict and will do so without favoring the debtor or burdening the creditor. The decision
of the arbiter would be judicially reviewable upon a showing of
fraud, misrepresentation, or other indicia of bad faith.

Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, state
personal property exemption law has evolved under the auspices
of the individual state legislatures. For nearly a quarter of a century, commentators and observers have decried the resulting lack
of uniformity, along with the gross obsolescence and faulty statutory structure, of state exemption laws. After carefully studying
the evolution and current status of state exemption statutes, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
decided in 1974 that uniform legislation was overdue and in 1976
promulgated the Uniform Exemptions Act. Since the UEA has
been successful in overcoming many of the flaws present in existing state personal property exemption statutes, the UEA, modified by innovative judicial administration techniques, is the best
way to effectuate the purposes of exemption law and balance the
competing interests of the debtor and creditor.

Richard L. Christenson

